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Abstract
I analyze the relationship between health care institutions and the utilization of outpatient services
by individuals aged 50 and above. I use cross-sectional micro data from thirteen European countries. I
focus on the out-of-pocket costs of health care utilization, the gatekeeper role of general practitioners, and
how these institutional settings are related to public and private care utilization. I nd that copayments
are related negatively to the probability of visiting a general practitioner among those in good health
condition. I estimate the utilization of private specialist care to be higher in countries where copayments
are required for public specialist care, and where the general practitioners have gatekeeper role. These
estimated associations with private specialist care utilization are relatively large in magnitude, and are
driven by individuals in the top income quartile.
JEL codes: I11, I18
Classications: health economics, health policy and administration
Keywords: outpatient care, private care, health care institutions, SHARE data
1 Introduction
In this paper I provide quantitative results on how the utilization of outpatient care among people aged 50
and above in Europe is related to the out-of-pocket costs of health care services and to the gatekeeper role
of general practitioners. As an empirical novelty, I also analyze the utilization of private care in relation to
the health care institutions. If the use of health services increases with public nancing then that might
indicate over-utilization, i.e. utilization above the socially optimal level. However, decreasing out-of-pocket
costs might improve the overall health level of the population through making preventive and curative health
services available. The use of private care is also of policy interest: it can decrease the burden on the public
budget and public health care facilities, but might violate the equal accessibility of health services.
The basic di¢ culty in the empirical analysis is that the prices of health services realized by the patients
are not observed. In order to analyze the relation between out-of-pocket costs and utilization I use the
indicators of cost-sharing arrangements as indirect measures of out-of-pocket costs. I base the empirical
analysis on household-level data, which has the advantage that a wide range of individual characteristics can
be controlled for which are likely to inuence the demand for health services. The data used are from the
An earlier version of this paper was written during my PhD studies at Central European University, Budapest, and consists
a chapter of my PhD thesis.
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second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). I analyze the utilization
of two types of outpatient health services: health care provided by general practitioners and by specialists.
The main novelty of the paper is estimating how some selected characteristics of the public health care
system are related to the utilization of private outpatient care. This analysis is possible since as a unique
feature of SHARE, information on private care utilization is included in the data. Two basic mechanisms
can inuence the demand for private care. First, the disutility of private care utilization can be lower than
that of public care, due to shorter waiting times or higher quality of services. Second, the costs of private
care services are typically higher. On the other hand, the demand for public outpatient care is inuenced
among others by the out-of-pocket costs of services, the availability and quality of care.
The main results indicate the expected associations between the analyzed nancing and organizational
indicators, and public and private care utilization. There is also some evidence that cost-sharing implies
higher utilization of public specialist care, which can be due to the higher quality of services or to reverse
causality. The estimation results indicate that if someone does not have any chronic health problem in the
analyzed 50+ population then the likelihood of visiting a public general practitioner (GP) is 13 percentage
points lower if copayments are required, 11 percentage points lower if GPs have gatekeeper role. The
estimated probability of visiting a private specialist is 4 percentage points higher if GPs act as gatekeepers,
and 3 percentage points higher if there are copayments for specialist care. These results are driven by people
in the top income quartile.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I summarize the main results of the related
empirical literature. In section 3 I present the basic characteristics of the health care systems in the analyzed
countries. The data used in the empirical analysis are described in section 4. The empirical specication
and the results of the regression models are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
There are few empirical results on the relationship between public health expenditures and health care de-
mand in Europe. As for the U.S., the general nding is that health insurance coverage and higher coinsurance
rate increase the demand for health services, due to the reduced costs of utilization. Such result is found
among others by [1], based on the RAND Health Insurance Experiment.
One strand of the related literature uses aggregate data to analyze the determinants of health care
utilization and aggregate health expenditures. As summarized by [2], there is consensus in the literature
that aggregate income is a crucial factor in explaining health expenditure di¤erences across the countries,
and it has positive e¤ect. This relationship is found e.g. by [3] based on a sample of 20 OECD countries
over years 1960 87, who at the same time do not nd any signicant e¤ect of public nancing on per capita
health expenditures. In contrast, [4] estimate a signicantly negative e¤ect of public nancing on health
expenditures, but they also nd a positive e¤ect of per capita GDP.
More information can be gained about the inuencing factors of health care utilization if individual data
are used. The horizontal equity in utilizing inpatient and outpatient care services in 11 developed countries
is analyzed by [5]. Their main nding is that there are only small inequities in the health care distribution.
[5] relate the cross-country di¤erences in equity to some country-specic health care characteristics as cost-
sharing and gatekeeping arrangements. However, due to the complexity of the health care systems no
clear patterns could be found. [6] use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to analyze the
determinants of outpatient care utilization in Europe, with a focus on the e¤ects of income and education.
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They report cross-country di¤erences, and nd that richer and more educated individuals utilize specialist
care generally to a higher extent. They relate these ndings to some institutional characteristics: copayments
required and the relative importance of the private sector can contribute to socioeconomic inequities.
In a recent paper [7] compare the importance of individual and institutional factors in outpatient care
utilization in Europe using the SHARE data, and nd greater role of individual factors. According to
their results, institutional factors like physician density, copayment and gatekeeping have a greater role in
determining visits to specialists than to general practitioners. [8] also provide an international analysis of
the determinants of outpatient care utilization based on the ECHP data. They estimate the organizational
variables to have basically the expected e¤ects, but they also nd that fee-for-service payment schemes
increase the frequency of visits to specialists. The authors conclude that this nding can indicate demand
induced by the physicians.
My research di¤ers from these papers not only in the applied sample and empirical methods, but also in
the research question. The aim here is to analyze the association between various characteristics of the health
care institutions and outpatient care utilization, and also to analyze if these institutional characteristics are
related the use of private health services. The main focus is on the relation between cost-sharing indicators,
the gatekeeper role of GPs, and outpatient care use.
Little is known about the determinants of private care utilization. A reason for the limited information is
the lack of a clear denition for private services. As [9] points out, private practitioners are always embedded
in the public regulations. Moreover, services nanced from private sources are not necessarily provided by
private agents.
Related to private health care, [10] analyzes the choice between private and public health care based on
U.K. data. Her main nding is that individuals who utilize private services are generally better-o¤ and also
more likely to have utilized private care in the past than those who do not utilize private services. However,
in the longitudinal dimension Propper also nds considerable movements of patients between the public
and private sectors. Since my empirical analysis is based on a cross-sectional sample, I analyze only the
inuencing factors of private care utilization, but not how persistent this utilization is over time. I make use
of the cross-country variations in institutions in this analysis.
3 Health care nancing and resources
In this section I summarize those features of the health systems in the analyzed countries which are relevant
for my empirical analysis. As the data used in the empirical analysis stem from years 2006-2007, the
description below corresponds to these years as much as possible.
Table 1 includes a set of aggregate statistics about health care resources and expenditures, in addition to
the indicators of cost-sharing and the gatekeeper role of GPs.1 The cross-country di¤erences in the relative
number of health care professionals and in the relative public and private expenditures are not negligible.
The out-of-pocket (OOP) costs of outpatient services cannot be described with a single measure. One
indicator is the ratio of private household out-of-pocket expenditures within the total health expenditures.
However, this indicator refers to all types of health expenditures, including the costs of hospital care and
1The source of the WHO data is the European health for all database.
The WHO denition of physician is a person who has completed studies in medicine at the university level. It excludes
among others physicians not practising, and dentists. The number of specialist includes the number of physicians specialized
in dermatology, gynecology, ophthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, paediatrics, radiology, and urology.
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medicines. Therefore additional information would be needed to estimate the e¤ect of OOP costs of outpa-
tient services on utilization.
The generosity of the mandatory health insurance can also inuence outpatient care utilization. More
generous public health system can imply not only lower OOP payments, but also less need for voluntary
health insurance. Higher public health expenditures relative to the GDP and to the population can indicate
better availability and higher quality of health services, which can induce demand for medical care.
Table 1 here
The utilization of health services can also be inuenced by the copayment requirements. In some of the
countries the patients have to pay for outpatient visits. Two main rationales for cost-sharing arrangements
are to reduce the burden on the public budget, and to avoid the problem of over-utilization. I summarize
below the cost-sharing policies for GP and specialist care in the analyzed countries. The summary is based
on [6] and [11]. The additional sources of information are indicated by country.
Apart from the health care resources, expenditures, and copayments for outpatient services, the legal
status of medical doctors also di¤er across the countries. As a key part of the empirical analysis I analyze the
utilization of outpatient services provided outside the frameworks of the public health care. This utilization
can be inuenced by the institutional settings, mainly as to what extent are substitutive or supplementary
providers and services available. Therefore I include brief descriptions on the country specic delivery of
outpatient services in the following summary (focusing on years 2006-2007).
Austria From 2006, 10 EUR/year service fee applies for the so-called e-card which replaces the previous
quarterly fee. Exemptions apply to children, pensioners receiving minimum pension, and to those with spec-
ied health problems. There is a mixture of private and public provision of outpatient services. Physicians
contracted with a health insurance fund have gatekeeper role. ([12])
Belgium The rate of copayments is 25% (10%) for GPs, and 40% (15%) for specialists. The values in
brackets apply for patients in socioeconomically vulnerable groups, among others pensioners and disabled
with income below a specied limit. GPs mainly work in private practices, whereas specialists can either
work in a private practice or at an outpatient department of a hospital. GPs have no gatekeeper function,
the patients can directly access the specialists. ([13])
Czech Republic User fees for doctoral visits were introduced only in 2008, before that the inpatient and
outpatient health services were free of charge. About 95% of the primary health services were privatized in
2002. The vast majority of outpatient specialists have also become private in the past few years. There is no
gatekeeping function of GPs, but referral from a GP to specialists is still recommended, and indeed common
practice. ([14], [15])
Denmark There are no copayments for GP care and for most of the specialist services for Group 1 citizens
(including 99% of the population), but specialist care is free only after a referral from a GP. Therefore GPs
act as gatekeepers for Group 1 citizens. People choose between coverage options "Group 1" - the default,
and "Group 2" - which provides free choice of physicians without referral from GP, but the costs are covered
only up to the corresponding costs of patients in Group 1. GPs and specialists are private, self-employed
practitioners. ([16])
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France The rate of copayments is 30%: people pay 100% up-front, but health insurance funds reimburse
70% of doctoral visit costs. In general there are no upper limit on the services reimbursed. Patients with
specied long-term illnesses are exempt from the copayments. Outpatient care is provided by self-employed
doctors. GPs have no gatekeeper role, but can voluntarily become so-called referring doctors, which is similar
to gatekeeping. In 2004 around 10% of GPs accepted this gatekeeping system. ([17])
Germany There is 10 EUR fee for the rst contact per quarter at a physicians o¢ ce, and 5-10 EUR
fee apply for services in ambulatory care. Exemptions apply to individuals su¤ering from chronic health
problems. Outpatient care is mainly provided by private for-prot providers. The patients can contact the
specialists directly but there are initiatives for the gatekeeping system, e.g. since 2004 the sickness funds
provide bonus for complying with the gatekeeping rules. ([18])
Greece There are no copayments for outpatient GP and specialist care, but informal payments are preva-
lent. Due to structural problems, the utilization of private care is widespread, which requires out-of-pocket
payments. Outpatient services are provided by public or private practitioners. GPs have no gatekeeper or
referral role in Greece. ([19])
Italy There are no copayments for GP consultations, but there is some evidence for informal payments.
The fee of specialist care varies by regions, the maximum amount is 36 EUR per visit. People with chronic
diseases, with disabilities, aged above 65 with income below a minimum are exempt from the copayments.
GPs contract with the government and act as gatekeepers, however some specialist services (e.g. gynecology
and optometric services) can be accessed directly. Because of the low quality and long waiting times in the
public sector, there is high demand for private specialist care. ([20])
Netherlands There are no cost-sharing arrangements for GP and outpatient specialist care. GPs are
registered at the government and have private practices. Outpatient specialist services are mainly provided
by the outpatient facilities of the hospitals. The specialists are self-employed and contract with the hospitals.
GPs act as gatekeepers, and the majority of medical problems are treated by them, which indicates that the
gatekeeping system is e¢ cient. ([21])
Poland There are no copayments for consultations with GPs and specialists in the public sector. There
is evidence that informal payments to physicians are prevalent, but the share of primary health care in
the informal payments is very small. GPs have an increasing role in the Polish health system. With some
exceptions, specialist services are available only with a referral from the GP. Outpatient specialist care is
provided either by private practitioners or by independent health care institutions. ([22])
Spain No cost-sharing arrangements apply for GP and outpatient specialist care in the public sector.
Informal payments are practically not present in the Spanish health care. Primary care provision is basically
publicly owned and sta¤ed. GPs act as gatekeepers, and may refer patients to specialized services if necessary.
For some service types referral is not needed. There is a mixture of private and public ownership in inpatient
and outpatient specialist care provision. ([23])
Sweden Fees apply for consultations with GPs (ca. 15 EUR) and specialists (ca. 30 EUR), with a
maximum of around 100 EUR per year. The fees vary by counties, but the maximum amount is set centrally.
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GP and specialist services are mainly publicly provided, but there are also private providers. It varies across
the counties if GPs have gatekeeping role. ([24])
Switzerland 10% cost-sharing applies for GP and outpatient specialist services, but there is an upper
limit on the copayments. In addition, people have to pay a part of the costs in the form of a deductible. This
is set annually up to around 1,100 EUR, varying by insurance companies. Most of the outpatient health
services are provided by independent practitioners. Patients have free choice of doctors, and have direct
access to ambulatory specialist care. ([25])
Due to the international di¤erences in the cost-sharing policies (xed fees, proportional fees, and the mix-
ture of these), it is not possible in the empirical analysis to control directly for the magnitude of copayments
required for outpatient services. On the other hand, it is possible to di¤erentiate the countries according
to copayments are required or not. The categorization is still not trivial, since the cost-sharing regulations
might vary across the population groups. I set the cost-sharing binary indicator to one in countries where
o¢ cial cost-sharing applies to the majority of the population. According to this di¤erentiation, cost-sharing
applies to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland in case of GP care. The list is
extended with Italy in case of specialist care. The countries can also be di¤erentiated on the basis if GPs
have a gatekeeper role, that is if a consultation with a GP is required for contacting a specialist. GPs
are gatekeepers in Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Based on the summary
provided above, outpatient services are provided to a large extent by private practitioners in the analyzed
countries. Therefore the question of interest in the empirical analysis is not the demand for private care per
se, but for such services which are out of the public health care system.
4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the second wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE), release 2.3.1.2 The SHARE is a panel data set, it covers individuals aged 50 or above,
and their spouses.
I analyze the utilization of health care services based on the second wave of SHARE because it has wider
country coverage than the rst wave. Identication by exogenous time-variation in health care systems is
not possible because there are generally only small changes in the health institutions between waves one and
two. The second wave of SHARE covers 14 countries, but since the imputations are not available for Ireland,
I include 13 countries in my analysis: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The total size of the sample used
is 30:8 thousand.
Applying individual data makes it possible to control for a wide range of individual and household specic
characteristics which can inuence health care utilization. The SHARE contains multiple imputations for
income and wealth measures, and I use the average of these. I report some descriptive statistics of the
variables in Table 2. The income and wealth measures are generated by dividing the household level measures
2This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.3.1, as of July 29th 2010. SHARE data collection in 2004-2007 was primarily
funded by the European Commission through its 5th and 6th framework programmes (project numbers QLK6-CT-2001- 00360;
RII-CT- 2006-062193; CIT5-CT-2005-028857). Additional funding by the US National Institute on Aging (grant numbers U01
AG09740-13S2; P01 AG005842; P01 AG08291; P30 AG12815; Y1-AG-4553-01; OGHA 04-064; R21 AG025169) as well as by
various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see http://www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
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with the household size, and the values are purchasing power parity adjusted. As health indicators I use the
number of reported chronic diseases the respondents ever had, ADL limitations, and reported symptoms.3
Table 2 here
The outcome variables refer to outpatient care utilization in the last 12 months before the interview.
These are the reported visits to GPs and specialists. In addition, I analyze the utilization of services
provided by private providers. Private care utilization is dened the following way in the generic SHARE
questionnaire: receiving any of the specied types of care from private providers that the respondent paid
himself or through a private insurance because he would have waited too long, or could not get them as
much as needed, in the National Health System. Thus, if for example GPs are private practitioners in a
country, but visits to GPs are covered by the social security system then utilization of GP care is not dened
as private care utilization.
The utilization measures cannot perfectly capture the demand for care, as there might be individuals
who demand a service but cannot access it. The SHARE wave 1 data provide some information on forgone
care, and only 0:4% of the respondents report forgoing GP care due to unavailability. For specialist care this
ratio is 0:9%.
Table 3 here
The percentage of respondents reporting outpatient care utilization in each country is presented in the rst
part of Table 3. Some of the cross-country di¤erences can be due to di¤erences in the characteristics of the
respondents, therefore in the second part of the table I present the predicted utilization for a representative
individual. I return to these predictions in section 5.3.
The binary indicator of public care utilization equals one if the respondent reports some health care
utilization, but no private care utilization. The utilization of specialist care varies more across the countries
than the utilization of GP services.
The binary indicator of private care utilization equals one if the respondent reports private care utilization.
Due to data limitations it cannot be identied if a respondent utilizes private care only or both private and
public care. Private care utilization is less prevalent for GP care than for specialist care. The highest ratio
of patients report private specialist care utilization in the Mediterranean countries, Poland, and Switzerland.
In these countries specialist health services are available only to a limited extent within the framework of
the public health system. These SHARE statistics are in line with the WHO statistics presented in Table
1, in the sense that the private care utilization statistics are positively correlated with the relative amount
of private health care expenditures. In Table 2 I also present the descriptive statistics for the subsample of
those individuals who report the utilization of private GP or specialist care. The only strong di¤erence is
that those who utilize private care report on average worse health status.
3The chronic health conditions included in the survey are: heart attack, high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, stroke,
diabetes, chronic lung disease, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, cancer, stomach ulcer, Parkinson disease, cataracts, hip or
fremoral fracture, Alzheimers disease, and benign tumor.
The ADL limitations include di¢ culties with dressing, walking across a room, eating, bathing, getting in or out of bed, and
using the toilet.
The specied symptoms are: pain in a joint, heart trouble, breathlessness, persistent cough, swollen legs, sleeping problems,
falling down, fear of falling down, dizziness, stomach problems, incontinence, and fatigue.
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5 Regression analysis
5.1 Benchmark models
I apply regression estimations so as to quantify the relationship between outpatient care utilization and the
indicators of health care institutions. Following the seminal paper of [26], I assume that health care utilization
is based on the utility maximizing behavior of the individuals. This assumption makes it reasonable to
include a rich set of regressors in the empirical model that can indicate individual specic health and "health
production" characteristics. In the preferred estimations I control for a set of institutional characteristics at
the same time. I di¤erentiate the utilization of public and private care.
Due to potential reverse causality from health care demand to health care institutions, my estimation
results cannot be interpreted as causal e¤ects of institutions on utilization. Still, the following analysis can
reveal some underlying mechanisms how the institutional settings inuence the health care utilization. Easier
access, higher quality and lower out-of-pocket costs of public health services can increase the demand for
and utilization of public care. As for private health services, the disutility attached to health services can
be lower due to the shorter waiting times or higher quality of services. Private care can be a suitable option
also if the access to public (specialist) care is restricted by gatekeeping. On the other hand, private care is
typically more costly for the patients than public care.
I estimate linear probability models of public and private care utilization. Since the regressors are the
same in the models of the two types of utilization, the seemingly unrelated regression estimates of public and
private care utilization are equivalent to the equation-by-equation OLS estimates.4 The estimated standard
errors of the coe¢ cients allow for clustering on the country level. Clustering is needed since I use country
level aggregate explanatory variables (following [27]), and also there might be some unobservables which are
country specic, thus correlated within countries. Using clustered standard errors has considerable e¤ect on
the statistical signicance of the country specic coe¢ cients.
The linear probability models have the following form:
Pr (Yi1 = 1) = Xi1 + Zi1 + vi1;
Pr (Yi2 = 1) = Xi2 + Zi2 + vi2; (1)
where Y1 refers to public care utilization, and Y2 to private care utilization, and index i is the individual index.
The X vector of regressors includes the following variables apart from a constant term: variables indicating
the individual budget constraint (logarithm of income, housing wealth, and nancial wealth), indicators of
individual preferences and health behaviors (age, gender, marital status, education level, current employment
status, being self employed ever, living area, and smoking dummies), and health indicators (number of
reported chronic health problems, ADL di¢ culties, symptoms). The Z vector includes the following country
specic regressors: the number of providers in the given service type, binary indicators of copayments
required for GP and specialist care, and a binary indicator of the gatekeeper role of GPs. I do not include
a measure of public health expenditures in these models since such a regressor would clearly be subject to
reverse causality. The more public health care the people utilize, the higher the public expenditures are.
4A weakness of the OLS specication is that it is based on linear probability models of utilization, which can predict
probabilities outside the 0  1 interval. However, the results are robust to estimating the models with logit estimation or with
multinomial logit, where the three choice alternatives are no utilization at all, public care, and private care utilization. The
multinomial logit estimation results (marginal e¤ects) are close to the OLS ones.
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I present in Table 4 the estimated coe¢ cients of the country specic regressors.5 The copayment and
gatekeeper indicators are binary variables, hence the coe¢ cients can be interpreted as the di¤erence in the
probability of utilization with and without copayment arrangements or gatekeeper function of GPs. For the
sake of comparison, in the rst part of Table 4 I also report the estimated coe¢ cients of interest if only one
of the country specic regressors is included at a time, apart from the individual specic controls.
Table 4 here
The estimated coe¢ cients of copayments, gatekeeper role, and the number of providers are qualitatively
robust to the inclusion of the country specic regressors one by one or jointly. The only exception here is the
coe¢ cient of the indicator of GP copayments, which has reverse sign under the two specication. In addition,
the estimated association between public specialist care utilization, and copayments and gatekeeper role are
signicantly di¤erent from zero only under the rst set of estimates. Such di¤erences are reasonable since
in the preferred regression analysis I control for the di¤erent institutional characteristics at the same time,
therefore I can estimate the ceteris paribus e¤ect of the included indicators. If the institutional characteristics
are included one by one in the utilization model then one estimated coe¢ cient can capture the e¤ect of several
institutional characteristics.
The estimation results indicate a non negligible but statistically insignicant negative association between
copayments and the probability of public GP care utilization. In countries where copayments are required
the probability of public GP care utilization is around 6 percentage points lower, holding the other factors
xed. At the same time the probability of private GP care utilization is about 1 percentage point higher. As
for specialist care, the estimation results indicate that the probability both of public and private specialist
care utilization is considerably higher if there are copayments. The relatively strong positive relationship
with public specialist care utilization can be explained either by supply side e¤ects (demand generated by
the health care providers), or by the higher quality of care if there are copayments.
If GPs have gatekeeper role in a country then the utilization of public outpatient specialist care is less
likely by more than 8 percentage points, whereas that of private specialist care is more likely by 4 percentage
points. The results indicate that the probability of GP care utilization is not in an economically or statistically
signicant relation with the gatekeeper role of GPs. The results also show that the higher relative number of
health care providers is associated with higher probability of public care utilization. The higher number of
providers can indicate better availability of services, and at the same time can be the consequence of higher
demand for health care services. The signicant coe¢ cient in case of GP care can capture the cross country
di¤erences in the role GPs have in the health care systems.
The estimation results can be compared to the related ndings in the literature. [8] nd based on the
ECHP data that the number of physicians increases the visits to GPs but not to specialists - according to
my estimates this e¤ect is positive or zero for both service types. They also estimate that the gatekeeper role
of GPs increases the utilization of GP services but decreases that of specialist services. However, my results
indicate negative e¤ect on both care types, although very weak and insignicant on GP care. [8] also analyze
how the payment of doctors a¤ects health care utilization, and nd that fee-for-service payments increase
specialist care utilization. This is in line with my result on the positive association between specialist care
utilization and copayments. Based on the ECHP data, [6] also nd that the gatekeeper role of GPs decreases
the utilization of specialist care, but increases the visits to GPs.
5The estimated coe¢ cients of the individual specic regressors are available from the author upon request.
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[7] estimate models of physician utilization based on the rst wave of SHARE data. The sign of the
e¤ect of gatekeeping on GP visits, and of copayments on specialist visits estimated by [7] are di¤erent from
my estimates. There are several potential reasons for these di¤erences: my estimates are based on a wider
range of countries, I do not analyze the number of visits, the additional control variables di¤er, and also the
gatekeeper and copayment arrangements are dened di¤erently - I generated these indicators based on the
"Health systems in transition" series of the WHO. On the other hand, it is a similar result that specialist
care utilization is more responsive to the institutional factors, especially to the copayment and gatekeeping
indicators, than the visits to GPs.
According to my knowledge, there are no directly comparable empirical studies which analyze and in-
ternationally compare the utilization of private health care services. [10] analyzes the demand for private
care in the U.K., and nds that better socioeconomic status is generally associated with higher demand for
private care services. Based on my estimations, a clear result is that higher number of reported chronic
health conditions and symptoms increases the use of private health care.
5.2 Heterogeneity analysis
To get further insights into how the outpatient care utilization di¤ers along the institutional characteristics,
I reestimate the linear models of utilization, allowing for heterogeneity with income and health status. This
analysis can reveal whether those in worse nancial status or worse health condition are more sensitive
to the health care nancing and gatekeeping arrangements. I interact the indicators of copayments and
gatekeeping rst with the binary indicators of receiving high or low income, then with reporting at least one
chronic health condition. The binary indicators of high and low income equal one if the reported amount of
income is above the country specic third quartile or below the rst quartile, respectively. The third quartile
has the highest value in Switzerland and the lowest in Poland, whereas the rst quartile is the highest in
Sweden, but again the lowest in Poland. As for the indicator of chronic health conditions, around 25% of
the respondents report at least one chronic illness. The estimated coe¢ cients of interest are presented in
Table 5.6
Table 5 here
There is some evidence for heterogeneous relation between the analyzed indicators of the health care
systems and the utilization of outpatient care. As for GP care utilization, the only signicant result for
heterogeneity across income groups is that those with low income are less likely to visit a GP if GPs have
gatekeeper role. Copayments and the gatekeeping role of GPs are associated with lower likelihood of GP
visits only if someone is in a good health condition. These negative associations are not present any more
for those who report chronic health problems. Copayments can reduce the over-utilization of GP care, but
might also decrease the utilization of preventive services among the healthy ones. The heterogeneity with
respect to health can be partly due to the fact that in many countries those with chronic health condition
are exempt from the copayments (see section 3 for some details).
The surprising positive association between public specialist care utilization and copayments is driven
by those who have relatively high income and who report chronic health problems. The interaction term of
copayments with low income is on the other hand negative. Again, the result that those with chronic health
conditions are more likely to visit a specialist if there are copayments can be caused by exemptions from the
6The estimated coe¢ cients of the individual specic regressors are available from the author upon request.
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copayments, but no evidence is found that similar exemptions would drive up the utilization among the low
income individuals. The results also indicate that the better-o¤ individuals are also more likely to utilize
private specialist care if GPs have gatekeeper role, whereas those with low income are less likely to do so.
Thus the gatekeeper role of GPs seems to direct some of the better-o¤ individuals towards private specialist
care, which might reduce the burden on the public health care system. A potential explanation can be that
people with higher income are more likely to have voluntary private health insurance and that is why they
use more private care. The second wave SHARE data do not provide information on the private health
insurance coverage. Based on the rst wave data [28] provides evidence that the probability of voluntary
private health insurance coverage indeed increases with income, and the voluntary insurance increases the
overall utilization of specialist care, although this e¤ect is insignicant.
In sum, the estimation results indicate that in the analyzed population if someone does not have any
chronic health condition then the copayments required for GP services decrease the likelihood of visiting
a public GP by 13 percentage points, and the gatekeeping role decreases it by 11 percentage points. The
estimated probability of visiting a private specialist is on average 4 percentage points higher if GPs act as
gatekeepers, and 3 percentage points higher if there are copayments for specialist care. These e¤ects are
driven by people in the top income quartile. Although these estimated associations are small in absolute
level, but comparing to the sample average of 3% utilizing private specialist care the relative magnitudes are
large.
5.3 Country specic analysis
In order to unveil which countries drive the above presented estimation results, I reestimate the utilization
models with including country dummies and omitting the country specic regressors. I then predict the
probabilities of outpatient care use for a representative individual who has the median value of the continuous
regressors and the mode of the categorical regressors. These results are presented in the second part of Table
3.
The predicted utilization probabilities are close to the observed utilization rates, showing that the ob-
served cross country di¤erences are mainly due to di¤erent institutional settings and not to di¤erences in
the characteristics of the respondents among the countries.
There are some clear relationships between the country specic predicted probabilities of use and the insti-
tutional characteristics, in line with the regression results of section 5.1. The binary indicator of copayments
for specialist care is associated with higher predicted probability of public specialist care use (correlation:
0.49). The gatekeeper role of GPs implies lower probability of public specialist care use (correlation: -0.44)
but higher probability of private specialist care use (correlation: 0.23). Finally, higher public health expendi-
tures are associated with higher likelihood of public care utilization. This association is negative with respect
to private outpatient care utilization. The correlation of expenditures per GDP with the predicted utilization
probability is similar for public GP care (0.49) and public specialist care (0.45). These positive associations
cannot reveal causal relations as higher demand for public care might cause the higher expenditures. The
country specic predicted probability of utilizing private care is on the other hand negatively related to
the relative magnitude of public health expenditures. This can be the consequence of more generous public
health care inducing the utilization of public care rather than private care, but the utilization of private care
also decreases the magnitude of public health expenditures. The negative correlation is smaller for private
GP care (-0.28) than for private specialist care (-0.49).
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6 Conclusions
There are considerable di¤erences in public and private outpatient health care utilization among the Euro-
pean countries. The aim of this paper is to analyze how the out-of-pocket costs of outpatient health services
and the gatekeeper role of general practitioners are related to public and private outpatient care utilization
of people aged 50 and above. This analysis is possible based on cross-national observations from Europe,
using the institutional variations across the countries. The individual observations make it possible to lter
out the inuencing role of socioeconomic characteristics and health status.
After providing an overview of the health care institutions, I analyze separately the utilization of general
practitioner and outpatient specialist services. I estimate regression models of public and private care
utilization, where in the preferred specication I control for the selected indicators of health care institutions
at the same time.
Based on the estimation results, the probability of visiting a GP is lower if copayments are required, but
only among those who do not report any chronic health conditions. Surprisingly, visiting both public and
private specialist is more likely if there are copayments for the public visits, but these positive associations
are present only for the better-o¤ individuals. The utilization of public outpatient care is lower if GPs have
gatekeeper role, and at the same time the utilization of private specialist care is higher among those who
have relatively high income.
These results indicate that if the aim is to avoid over-utilization of outpatient public health care then
decreasing the generosity of public nancing might be e¤ective in demand reduction. However, such policy
changes can also decrease the utilization of important preventive services, which can eventually lead to
worsening health condition. The empirical results also suggest that if the out-of-pocket costs of public
health care are increased or if general practitioners have gatekeeper role then individuals partly substitute
the public health services with private ones.
I conclude with some cautionary notes. The ndings of the paper are based on a sample of individuals
aged 50 and above, from thirteen countries, all of which are developed European countries. Therefore the
estimates might not be valid for the whole population or for countries with much di¤erent health care systems.
Moreover, only a limited number of institutional characteristics can be controlled for because of the limited
number of countries in the sample. Reverse causality is also an important concern, as the institutional
settings might be altered based on the demand for health care services. Thus endogeneity concerns remain
in the regression analysis and I cannot claim causality. Finally, the identication is based on cross-country
variation and not on the analysis of health care reforms, hence the policy implications of the results have to
be treated carefully.
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Whole sample Private care utilized
mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
age 64.78 10.02 65.15 9.95
female 0.55 0.50 0.60 0.49
marital status: with spouse 0.71 0.46 0.71 0.45
marital status: with partner 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18
marital status: single 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44
income (1000 EUR) 19.31 116.82 20.88 138.94
main residence (1000 EUR) 90.28 207.67 93.24 160.95
nancial wealth (1000 EUR) 30.15 87.88 28.32 79.50
education: primary 0.32 0.46 0.39 0.49
education: lower secondary 0.18 0.38 0.12 0.33
education: upper secondary 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47
education: tertiary 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37
area: big city 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.39
area: suburbs big city 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32
area: large town 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39
area: small town 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39
area: rural 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47
employment: retired 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.50
employment: employed 0.27 0.45 0.23 0.42
employment: unemployed 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.12
employment: disabled 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24
employment: homemaker 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35
self employed ever 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36
smoking: never 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44
smoking: stopped 0.58 0.49 0.57 0.50
smoking: yes 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38
# illnesses 1.64 1.52 2.25 1.79
# ADL problems 0.23 0.84 0.35 1.02
# symptoms 1.80 1.91 2.53 2.27
GP visit (binary) 0.80 0.40 0.88 0.32
specialist visit (binary) 0.43 0.49 0.78 0.41
Observations 30,818 1,395
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Observed utilization Predicted utilization at the median
Public care Private care Public care Private care
GP Specialist GP Specialist GP Specialist GP Specialist
AT 82.4% 51.2% 1.0% 2.7% 83.2% 48.0% 0.6% 2.0%
BE 88.6% 53.0% 1.0% 0.6% 88.8% 47.4% 0.6% -0.3%
CZ 84.8% 50.8% 0.2% 0.8% 84.5% 48.3% -0.4% 0.4%
DK 77.1% 22.2% 2.6% 0.6% 78.7% 16.8% 2.1% -0.8%
FR 87.5% 51.2% 2.1% 1.4% 89.5% 48.1% 1.7% 0.7%
DE 84.1% 55.8% 0.3% 0.2% 86.0% 52.1% -0.1% -0.9%
GR 64.8% 29.0% 3.2% 7.2% 67.1% 30.4% 3.1% 7.8%
IT 83.8% 36.8% 0.4% 12.2% 82.7% 34.3% 0.1% 12.2%
NL 72.3% 39.5% 0.8% 0.6% 75.5% 35.8% 0.7% 0.1%
PL 72.7% 23.0% 3.7% 5.7% 71.8% 19.3% 3.1% 5.2%
ES 81.2% 34.7% 0.8% 2.9% 80.9% 33.0% 0.5% 3.0%
SE 66.4% 34.6% 1.3% 1.5% 67.1% 29.8% 0.7% 0.6%
CH 65.8% 29.9% 8.8% 5.6% 69.3% 30.7% 8.7% 5.0%
Table 3: Outpatient care utilization by countries
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One control GP Specialist
at a time public private public private
GP copayment 0.038 0.003
[0.91] [0.36]
specialist copayment 0.108 0.011
[1.98] [0.56]
GP gatekeeper -0.008 -0.004 -0.115 0.018
[0.21] [0.47] [2.34] [0.85]
# providers per 1000 0.127 -0.012 0.037 0.012
[7.10] [1.59] [0.94] [1.38]
Controls included GP Specialist
jointly public private public private
GP copayment -0.055 0.014
[1.14] [0.81]
specialist copayment 0.074 0.026
[1.52] [1.15]
GP gatekeeper -0.004 0.000 -0.084 0.040
[0.14] [0.05] [1.59] [1.55]
# providers per 1000 0.156 -0.020 0.009 0.023
[4.37] [1.33] [0.28] [1.57]
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
based on clustered standard errors, t statistics in brackets
Table 4: Estimated coe¢ cients based on the OLS models of utilization (coe¢ cients of individual specic
characteristics not reported)
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Interactions with income indicators Interactions with health indicator
GP Specialist GP Specialist
public private public private public private public private
GP copayment -0.048 0.016 -0.131 0.009
[0.99] [0.84] [2.46] [0.58]
specialist copeyment 0.073 0.027 0.028 0.026
[1.48] [1.26] [0.66] [1.38]
gatekeeper 0.002 -0.001 -0.086 0.037 -0.112 -0.004 -0.121 0.031
[0.07] [0.09] [1.62] [1.55] [3.61] [0.62] [2.51] [1.52]
high incomeGP copay -0.006 -0.004
[1.2] [1.11]
low incomeGP copay -0.013 -0.002
[1.39] [0.53]
illnessGP copay 0.101 0.008
[4.17] [1.56]
high incomespecialist copay 0.029 0.013
[2.80] [2.50]
low incomespecialist copay -0.025 -0.013
[2.03] [2.12]
illnessspecialist copay 0.060 -0.001
[3.11] [0.19]
high incomegatekeeper 0.000 0.003 -0.009 0.024
[0.01] [0.85] [0.58] [3.06]
low incomegatekeeper -0.020 -0.001 0.018 -0.018
[2.28] [0.43] [1.20] [3.28]
illnessgatekeeper 0.144 0.005 0.049 0.012
[6.44] [1.56] [1.50] [1.10]
# GP per 1000 0.156 -0.020 0.155 -0.020
[4.39] [1.33] [4.35] [1.33]
# physicians per 1000 0.010 0.023 0.009 0.023
[0.30] [1.69] [0.27] [1.58]
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1% based on clustered standard errors,
t statistics in brackets
Table 5: Estimated coe¢ cients in the extended OLS models of utilization (coe¢ cients of individual specic
characteristics not reported)
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